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D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-oooOooo-

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 990275-CA

vs.

GREG TUCKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Priority No. 2
This is an appeal of the trial court's failure to sustain the defendant's
objection regarding the state's failure to produce discoverable information and
adequately respond to the defendant's Request for Bill of Particulars. In this matter,
the defendant submitted a Request for Discovery and a Request for Bill of Particulars.
It was not until the day of trial was the defendant apprized of the prosecution's theory
that the defendant violated an Ex Parte Protective Order, rather than a Protective Order
as alleged in the information. Such failures unfairly prejudiced the defendant at trial as
the defendant did not have adequate opportunity to prepare a defense against a claimed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

violation of the Ex Parte Protective Order. Mr. Oliver, attorney for defendant, knew
that the time-line did not match regarding the protective order. The alleged incident
occurred on September 2, 1998. The defendant had not been served with the Protective
Order until after that date. Thus, no violation of the Protective Order, or law,
occurred-that was the defense's theory going into trial the morning of January 22,
1999. When the issue of the State's failure was raised, the court ruled that the Ex
Parte Protective Order is a Protective Order. However true that may be, without
concession, the problem still remained as the prosecution failed to clearly disclose it's
theory of the case timely. Within the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the Act defines the
meanings of both Protective Order and Ex Parte Protective Order and it was reasonable
for the defense to believe that the State intended to show a violation of the Protective
Order and not of the ex parte order. This is especially true when Section 76-5-108
specifically names both orders allowing for a violation of either.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
(1953, as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). The appellant appeals
the final order and judgment of the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Grand
County involving his conviction of a Violation of a Protective Order, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1953, as amended).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the defendant had been denied due process of law by the State's

failure to provide him with adequate notice of the State's intended case.
2.

Whether an Ex Parte Protective Order is a Protective Order, within the

intended meaning which would remove the State of the obligation to provide the
defendant with adequate notice in order to prepare his defense.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(l)-(2). The defendant was denied due process of law and he was not
afforded adequate notice in order to prepare a defense. The State's Informationfiledin
this matter was defective, and the State failed to respond to the defense's timely filed
Request for Bill of Particulars.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Ward v. Richfield City, 798
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). Utah appellate courts review questions of law under
a correction of error standard, without deference to the trial court. Bellon v.
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Ward, 798 P.2d at 759.
State v. Bagshaw. 836 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Because the application of a statute is a question of law, the appellate court must review
for correctness the actions of the trial court. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1164
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
[Included herewith in Addendum A.]
3
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from an appeal of die final judgment of the Seventh

District Court. On September 18, 1998, the State filed an Information against Mr.
Tucker claiming a violation of "a protective order issued by this Court after having
been properly served with it." (R. at 1). This charge was never amended. The defense
knew that the State would be unable to prove timely service (and knowledge) because
the Protective Order had not been served upon die defendant at the time of the incident.
The order had only been entered on September 2, 1998. (See Addendum B).
Meanwhile, in response to me defense's request for discovery and request for a bill of
particulars, me prosecution only provided die defense a copy of the information
claiming a violation of me "protective order" and failed to attempt any supplementation
or revision.
On die day of trial, January 22, 1999, die defense presented me trial court
witii Mr. Tucker's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 52-62, Addendum C). In die defense's
motion, me defense claims numerous technical errors regarding the protective order.
The motion should have been dispositive of die issues suspect for trial. But for die
judge's avoidance of die issue by substituting die protective order wim die ex parte,
trial would not have occurred. The judge's decision relieved die State of its legal
obligations abridging Mr. Tucker's constitutional rights which resulted in substantial

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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prejudice. This appeal followed.
//.

Course of the Proceedings:
On September 18, 1998, The State filed it's Information against Mr.

Tucker claiming a violation of the September 2, 1998 protective order. (R. at 1). The
alleged incident occurred on that same date, September 2nd. Mr. Oliver was retained
and he entered his appearance on October 5, 1998. (R. at 5-14). This appearance was
accompanied by a Request for Discovery as well as a Request for Bill of Particulars.
(Supra.) The State's response to the request for a bill of particulars merely referenced
to the State Informationfiledagainst Mr. Tucker.
Believing the State's Information to be accurate depiction of the State's
case, Mr. Tucker prepared a defense against the alleged Protective Order. Trial was
subsequently held on January 22, 1999 after the trial judge ruled that the State could
proceed with trial on the claims for violating the ex parte order. This trial day
substitution prejudiced the defense at trial because the defense's exhibits were
Protective Order related not Ex Parte Protective Order related. After the denial of the
defense's motion to dismiss, the jury returned to the courtroom and the State presented
it's case.
///.

Disposition in Trial Court:
The trial jury returned a verdict of guilty.
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IV.

Statement of Facts:
See part II above.1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under Section 76-5-108, Mr. Tucker was convicted of violating an Ex
Parte Protective Order, a Class A Misdemeanor. However, this theory was not the
purported case for the State up till the day of trial. The State's theory apparently
changed upon notice, or receipt of the faxed copy of the defense's motion to dismiss.
Nevertheless, at the trial, die court allowed me State to proceed with trial on the
premise that Mr. Tucker violated the Ex Parte Protective Order. At no time prior to
this date did me defense suspect that the State's case could change the day of trial.
Discovery and requests for Bills of Particular were submitted and are designed to avoid
this type of surprise during trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN SURSTA NT!A TJJ DEPRIVED OF DUE
PROCESS BY DIRECTLY VIOLATING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSES OF
THE CONSTITUTIONS.
Mr. Tucker has certain rights as an accused person. Under me Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution,

1

The course of the proceedings is the nature of this appeal.
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an accused person enjoys certain inalienable rights, including among other things, the
right to be confronted with his charges prior to trial so as to benefit him with the
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.
(1) Constitutional Provisions.
The Utah State Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have therightto appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
therightto appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure therightsherein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. Moreover, the Constitution states:
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the
consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without such examination
and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be prescribed by the Legislature.
Utah Const, art. I, § 13.
The U.S. Constitution provides the same protections, under the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.
These redundant and overlapping constitutional protections are best
explained in the Utah Constitution Article I, Section 26 and 27, which provides:
7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by
expressed words they are declared to be otherwise.
Utah Const, art. I, § 26.
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.
Utah Const, art. I, § 27.
(2) Statutory Provisions.

?

Section 77-14-1 provides:
The prosecuting attorney, on timely written demand of the defendant, shall within
ten days, or such other time as the court may allow, specify in writing as
particularly as is known to him the place, date and time of the commission of the
offense charged.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1 (1997).
(3) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or
information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been
committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant
is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by
statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give
the defendant notice of the charge. An information may contain or be
accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out probable cause to
sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things as time, place,
means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged unless
necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, written
instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things may be
8
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obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters
of judicial notice need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or
information.
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or
information may be amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to
bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of
particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter,
or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, on its own motion,
direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or
supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may require. The
request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of
factual information needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular
offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name
contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained
in the statute creating or defining the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning
unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning,
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the
indictment or information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was
based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not
affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of
the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing
of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose
names are not so endorsed.
9
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(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear
before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings
against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural person.
Id. (Emphasis added).

B. Mr. Tucker was Deprived of Due Process as a Result of the State's Trial Day
Change in the Theory of the State's Case-Defective Notice.
In this matter, the prosecution failed to disclose it's intended case alleging a
violation of the Ex Parte Protective Order. The State seemed insistent that it claimed a
violation of the "Protective Order". (R. at 1). The defense believes that the prosecution
changed it's theory on the case only as a result of receiving a copy of the defense's
motion to dismiss. Unfortunately, the change in the theory did not come out until the day
of trial. The trial judge allowed trial to proceed on the premise that Mr. Tucker violated
the Ex Parte Protective Order entered by the court on July 30, 1998, rather than the
Protective Order entered by the court on September 2, 1998.
r

Rule 4, supra., states when a defendant may file for a Bill of Particulars. In

the case at hand, the defense did timely render such a request. In response, the plaintiff
reasserted it's case to be that Mr. Tucker violation the Protective Order as set forth in the
State's Information. The purpose of a request for a bill of particulars is to avoid the very
problem, the surprise which occurred in this trial.
The issue of bills of particulars was addressed very clearly by the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Wilcox. 808 P.2d 1028 (1991). The Court's opinion reads:

10
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We first consider the state constitutional provisions that grant a defendant a right
to adequate notice of the charged offense. The right to adequate notice may be
based on the general due process clause in article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution. Utah Const, art. I, § 7. It may also be based on the more specific
guarantee in article I, section 12, which states that "the accused shall have the
right... to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, [and] to
have a copy thereof." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. With regard to the issues presented
here, this court has held that the analysis under the due process clause is not
different from that required by article I, section 12. State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,
1214 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S. Ct. 777, 98 L. Ed. 2d 864
(1988). Essentially, the constitutional question is whether "a criminal defendant
[is] sufficiently apprised of the particulars of the charge to be able to 'adequately
prepare his defense.1" Icl (quoting State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah
1985)).
In determining whether a defendant has been denied this right, we follow a rather
elaborate analysis that focuses on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(e) and
section 77-14-1 of the Code, the provisions that implement the constitutional
guarantee. See Utah R. Crim. P. 4(e); Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1 (1990). Only
after we have found that a defendant has not waived the rights the statute and rule
provide do we decide whether the notice given was adequate. See Fulton, 742
P.2datl215.
As Fulton explained, the notice to which a defendant is constitutionally entitled
may come through one or all of three sources: the charging information, a
response to a bill of particulars under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or a response, under section 77-14-1 of the Code, to a demand for the
place, date, and time of the offense charged. See Fulton. 742 P.2d at 1214. Utah
law provides that a defendant who so requests is entitled as a matter of right to
both a bill of particulars and a specification of the date, place, and time of the
charged crime. Id; State v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985); see also
State v. Solomon. 93 Utah 70, 75, 71 P.2d 104, 106 (1937). However, if a
defendant fails to request a bill of particulars or make demand for the date, place,
and time under section 77-14-1 and a response to either of
these would have cured the claimed deficiency, then he or she will be deemed to
have waived the constitutional right to adequate notice. Fulton. 742 P.2d at 1215.
If the defendant has not waived the right to more specific information and the
State has responded with the best information it has, or if the defendant has not
requested additional information but the information if requested would not have
ii
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given further notice, then we proceed to determine whether the notice supplied to
the defendant is constitutionally adequate. Id The right to adequate notice in the
Utah Constitution requires the prosecution to state the charge with sufficient
specificity to protect the defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same crime
and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to prepare a defense. Id at 1214;
State v. Strand 720 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1986); State v. Bundv. 684 P.2d 58, 62
(Utah 1984); State v. Mvers. 5 Utah 2d 365, 371, 302 P.2d 276, 279 (1956).
Because of the almost infinite variety of circumstances where the question may
arise, there are few ironclad rules for determining the adequacy of notice beyond
the requirement that the elements of the offense be alleged. See Utah R. Crim. P.
4(a). In the area of variance between the allegations and the proof at trial, we
have some helpful precedent. See, e.g., State v. Marcum. 750 P.2d 599, 601-02
(Utah 1988); Strand. 720 P.2d at 428; State v. Burnett. 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah
1985); McNairv. Havward 666 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 1983); Utah R. Crim. P.
30(a). But outside that area, a challenge to the constitutional adequacy of notice
inevitably draws us into a generalized weighing of the completeness of the notice
and its adequacy for the defendant's purposes against the background of the
information legitimately available to the prosecuting authority.
Id In the case at hand, Mr. Tucker had not been adequately provided notice, thus
violating the due process protections guaranteed to him. He did not waive his right to
more specific information, rather he exercised that right. Utah law provides that a
defendant who so requests a bill of particulars is entitled as a matter of right to both a bill
of particulars and a specification of the date, place, and time of the charged. Mr. Tucker,
in this case, made his request for more specific information on or about October 5, 1998,
just a little more than two weeks from the filing date of the information.
In addition to being entitled to dates, places, and times, the nature and
cause of the offense the prosecution must be disclose additional specific information
upon the request by the defendant. This information includes information relating to
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means, intent, manner, and other relatedfactual evidence necessary to charge the
offense. Moreover, the State must describe such things^as written instruments, pictures,
statutes and judgments may be described by any name or description by which they are
generally known, this would include the correct order allegedly violated. However, in
violation of the Utah State Constitution. Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-L and Rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecution merely responded with a reference to
thefiledInformation. This the response the State provided was insufficient, thus
violating Mr. Tucker's right to due process.
At the trial, when the defense raised this issue was addressed by the
defense, the trial judge responded with, "Denied. When you wait until two days before
the trial to indicate what you think his theory is, I don't think Mr. Benge has to
immediately call you and tell you that he thinks you're mistaken about that, and an ex
parte protective order is a protective order. The Court will be in recess." (R. at 15 pg.
8).2
The trial court may be right, an ex parte protective order is a protective
order. However, there are distinctions. The Legislature specifically defined them
separately so that the Legislature could provide an accused person with notice that he
may be charged with violating either a protective order or an ex parte protective order.

2

The clerk of the trial court did not individually paginate the trial transcript, only
the cover was marked as 115 of the record. Therefore, pages referred to in the transcript
will be cited as the Record followed by "@" and the page number of the transcript itself.
13
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In section 30-6-1(7) of the Utah Code, "'Ex parte protective order' means an order
issued without notice to the defendant in accordance with this chapter." In section 306-1(11) of the Utah Code, "'Protective order' means a restraining order issued pursuant
to this chapter subsequent to a hearing on the petition, of which the petitioner has given
notice in accordance with this chapter."
-

Meanwhile, in the criminal code, section 76-5-108 criminalizes violations

of either protective orders or ex parte protective orders. In particular, the statute
provides:
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order
or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse
. Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36,
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as described in
Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after having
been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater
penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures
Act.
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic violence
offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance
with Section 77-36-1.1.
Id.

In light of the language of section 76-5-108, the prosecution is required to clarify

it's intentions by disclosing it's theory on the case upon the request of the defendant.
It's not unreasonable for the State to identify whether it intends to prosecute the
defendant for a knowing violation of the ex parte protective order or of the protective
order.
As a result of the State's errant disclosure to the defense, the defense

14
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believed the State was claiming Mr. Tucker violated the Protective Order, so the
defense prepared it's case against the Protective Order, alone. This belief is selfevident by the issues raised in the defense's motion to dismiss. The defense's motion
should have disposed of the case. Instead, the trial court saved the State's case at the
expense of Mr. Tucker's constitutional rights. The State should have been held
accountable for it's error; the trial court should have granted the defense's motion to
dismiss. Obviously, this would mean the State could have refiled claiming a violation
of the ex parte order, however, the defense believes even that claim was defensible on
the merits.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Tucker has been unjustiy treated in this matter. The trial court
should not have denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The State had 126 days to
provide the defendant notice of the State's intended theory that Mr. Tucker violated the
ex parte protective order. The day-of-trial disclosure of Ae State's actual allegation
appears to be out of convenience, due to the defense's notice to the prosecution of the
motion to dismiss. As a result, Mr. Tucker was deprived of due process and he was
prevented an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense to the State's allegations.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of
March, 2000.
%

&

D. BRUCE OLIVER
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 27th day of March, 2000,
I served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the
Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: William L. Benge, Grand County
Attorney, 125 East Center Street, Moab, Utah 84532.

'

Dated this 27th day of March. 2000.

^<^^W

..

D. BRUCE OLIVER
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Section
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]

PREAMBLE

Article
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
XX.
XXI.
XXII.
XXIII.
XXIV.

28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]
Declaration of Rights
State Boundaries

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that

Ordinance
Elections and Right of Suffrage
Distribution of Powers
Legislative Department
Executive Department
Judicial Department
Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
Education
Counties, Cities and Towns
Local Governments [Proposed]
Corporations
Revenue and Taxation
Public Debt
Militia
Labor
Water Rights
Forestry
Public Buildings and State Institutions
Public Lands
Salaries
Miscellaneous
Amendment and Revision
Schedule
PREAMBLE

right.

1896

Sec. 2. [All political p o w e r i n h e r e n t i n t h e people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require.
Sec. 3. [Utah i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e Union.]
The State of U t a h is an inseparable part of the Federal
Union and the Constitution of the United States is t h e
supreme law of the land.
1896
Sec. 4.

Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, t h e people
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
[Religious liberty.] [Proposed.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
21. [Slavery forbidden.]
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
25. [Rights retained by people.]

[Religious liberty — N o property qualification
t o v o t e o r h o l d office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or t h e
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896
[Religious liberty.] [Proposed.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote a t any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or t h e
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
[1999]
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, t h e public
safety requires it.
1896

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
1984 (2nd S.S.)
Sec. 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896
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Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
substantial evidence to support the charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
support the new felony charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd s.s.)

Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital .cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer t h a n eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish t h e number ofjurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer t h a n four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
Sec. 11. [Courts o p e n — R e d r e s s of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.
1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]

680

Sec. 13.

[Prosecution b y information or i n d i c t m e n t —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947

681
Sec. 25.
This enu
or deny oth

Sec. 26.
The pro
prohibitory
otherwise.

Sec. 27.
Sec. 14.

[Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issua n c e of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
1896

Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury t h a t the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
Sec. 16. [No i m p r i s o n m e n t for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896

Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896

Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying wrar
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to t h e civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
1896
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad- Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
1896
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her convicted, shall exist within this State.
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
S e c . 22. [Private property for public use.]
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary use without just compensation.
1896
examination, the function of t h a t examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preNo law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute privilege or immunity.
1896
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
S e c . 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
Digitized
by the Howard
W. HunterisLaw Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School,
respect to release of the defendant
if appropriate
discovery
All laws
of a general
nature
shallBYU.
have uniform operation.
Machine-generated
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994 OCR, may contain errors.
1896

Frequenl
to the secu
governmen

Sec. 28.
(1) Tbpr
process, vie
(a) r
and to
crimin

(b) I
tobeh
to the
sentati
chargii
(0 1
imposi
withou
cerninj
person
does n
privilej
(2) Noth
cause of acl
for dismiss
judgment.
(3) The ]
crimes an<
offenses, au
(4) The
define this

Section
1. [State

Section 1,
The bom
Beginnm
thirty-seco]
t h e thirty-i
along said
intersectioi
longitude v
thirty-seve;
t h e same
thence due
tude to th(
degree of 1<
along said
section of 1
tude; them
latitude to
degree of 1<
along said

681

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 27. [ F u n d a m e n t a l rights.]
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
government.
1896
Sec. 28. [Declaration of t h e rights of crime victims.]
(1) l b preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due
process, victims of crimes have these rights, as denned by law:
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity,
and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the
criminal justice process;
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and
to be heard at important criminal justice hearings related
to the victim, either in person or through a lawful representative, once a criminal information or indictment
charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and consider,
without evidentiary limitation, reliable information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense except that this subsection
does not apply to capital cases or situations involving
privileges.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a
cause of action for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or
for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief from any criminal
judgment.
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony
crimes and such other crimes or acts, including juvenile
offenses, as the Legislature may provide.
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and
define this section by statute.
1994
ARTICLE II
STATE BOUNDARIES
Section
1. [State boundaries.]
S e c t i o n 1. [State boundaries.]
The boundaries of the State of Utah shall be as follows:
Beginning at a point formed by the intersection of the
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washington, with
the thirty-seventh degree of north latitude; thence due west
along said thirty-seventh degree of north latitude to the
intersection of the same with the thirty-seventh degree of
longitude west from Washington; thence due north along said
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to the intersection of
the same with the forty-second degree of north latitude;
thence due east along said forty-second degree of north latitude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-fourth
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south
along said thirty-fourth degree of west longitude to the intersection of the same with the forty-first degree of north latitude; thence due east along said forty-first degree of north
latitude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-second
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south
along said thirty-second degree of west longitude to the place
of beginning.
1896

Art. Ill

ARTICLE i n

Sec. 25. [Rights r e t a i n e d by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people.
1896
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory a n d prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise.
1896

~

ORDINANCE
Section
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.]
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of
lands — Exemption.]
[Territorial debts assumed.]
[Free nonsectarian schools.]
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the
consent of the United States and the people of this State:
[Religious toleration — P o l y g a m y forbidden.]
First: — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in
person or property on account of his or h e r mode of religious
worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever
prohibited.
1896
[Right t o public d o m a i n d i s c l a i m e d — Taxation of lands
— Exemption.]
Second: — The people inhabiting this State do affirm and
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held
by any Indian or Indian tribes, and t h a t until the title thereto
shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.
The lands belonging to citizens of the United States, residing
without this State shall never be taxed a t a higher rate than
the lands belonging to residents of this State; but nothing in
this ordinance shall preclude this state from taxing, as other
lands are taxed, any lands owned or held by any Indian who
has severed his tribal relations, and has obtained from the
United States or from any person, by patent or other grant, a
title thereto, save and except such lands as have been or may
be granted to any Indian or Indians under any act of Congress,
containing a provision exempting the lands t h u s granted from
taxation, which last mentioned lands shall be exempt from
taxation so long, and to such extent, as is or may be provided
in the act of Congress granting the same.
1945
[Territorial debts assumed.]
Third: — All debts and liabilities of t h e Territory of Utah,
incurred by authority of the Legislative Assembly thereof, are
hereby assumed and shall be paid by this State.
1896
[Free nonsectarian schools.]
Fourth: — The Legislature shall make laws for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which
shall be open to all the children of the State and be free from
sectarian control.
1896
ARTICLE IV
ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE
Section
1. [Equal political rights.]
2. ^[Qualifications to vote.]
3. [Voters — Immunity from arrest.]
4. [Voters — Immunity from militia duty.]
5. [Voters to be citizens of United States.]
6. [Mentally incompetent persons, convicted felons, and certain criminals ineligible to vote.]
7. [Property qualification forbidden.]
8. [Ballot to be secret.]
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30-5-1. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "District court" means the district court within
whose jurisdiction the grandchildren reside.
(2) "Grandchildren'' means the child or children t h a t a
grandparent is seeking visitation rights with under this
chapter.
(3) "Grandparent" means a person whose child is the
parent of the grandchildren.
1992
(1) The district court may grant grandparents reasonable
rights of visitation, if it is in the best interest of the grandchildren, in cases where a grandparent's child has died or has
become a noncustodial parent through divorce or legal separation.
(2) In cases other t h a n those described in Subsection (1), a
grandparent may petition the court for reasonable rights of
visitation with a grandchild. The court may enter an order
granting the petitioner reasonable visitation rights in accordance with the provisions and requirements of this Subsection
(2). There is a presumption t h a t a parent's decision with
regard to grandparent visitation is reasonable. The court may
override the parent's decision and grant reasonable visitation
rights to a grandparent if it finds that:
(a) it is in the best interest of the grandchild;
(b) the petitioner is a fit and proper person to have
rights of visitation with the grandchild;
(c) the petitioner has repeatedly attempted to visit the
grandchild and has not been allowed to visit the grandchild as a direct result of the actions of the p a r e n t or
parents;
(d) there is no other way for the petitioner to visit t h e
grandchild without court intervention; and
(e) the petitioner has, by clear and convincing evidence,
rebutted the presumption t h a t the parent's decision to
refuse or limit visitation with the grandchild was reasonable.
(3) Adoption of a child, voluntary or involuntary termination of parental rights, or relinquishment to a licensed child
placing agency terminates all rights of a biological grandparent to petition for visitation under this section.
(4) Grandparents may petition the court as provided in
Section 78-32-12.2 to remedy a parent's wrongful noncompliance with a visitation order.
1998

CHAPTER 6
COHABITANT ABUSE ACT
Section
30-6-1.
30-6-2.
30-6-3.
30-6-4.
30-6-4.1.

1983

Section
30-6-4.4.
30-6-4.5.
30-6-4.6.

No denial of relief solely because of lapse of time.
Mutual protective orders prohibited.
Prohibition of court-ordered or court-referred
mediation.
30-6-4.8.
Electronic monitoring of domestic violence offenders.
30-6-5 to 30 6-7. Repealed.
30-6-8.
Statewide domestic violence network — Peace
officers' duties — Prevention of abuse in absence of order — Limitation of liability.
30-6-9, 30-6 10. Repealed.
30-6-11.
Division of Child and Family Services — Development and assistance of volunteer network.
30-6-12.
Full faith and credit for foreign protective orders.
30-6-14.
Authority to prosecute class A misdemeanor violations.

30-5-2. Visitation rights of grandparents.

1977

'good
;er an
/orce,

30-6-1

30-6-4.2.

30-6-4.3.

Definitions.
Abuse or danger of abuse — Protective orders.
Venue of action.
Forms for petitions and protective orders —
Assistance.
Continuing duty to inform court of other proceedings — Effect of other proceedings.
Protective orders — Ex parte protective orders —
Modification of orders — Service of process —
Duties of the court.
Hearings on ex parte orders.

30-6-1. D e f i n i t i o n s .
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abuse" means attempting to cause, or intentionally
or knowingly causing to an adult or minor physical harm
or intentionally placing another in fear of imminent
physical harm.
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuant to Section 15-2-1 or a person who is 16 years of age or
older who:
(a) is or was a spouse of the other party;
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party;
(c) is related by blood or marriage to the other
party;
(d) has one or more children in common with the
other party; or
(e) resides or h a s resided in the same residence as
the other party.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does
not include:
(a) the relationship of n a t u r a l parent, adoptive
parent, or step-parent to a minor; or
(b) the relationship between natural, adoptive,
step, or foster siblings who are under 18 years of age.
(4) "Court clerk" means a district court clerk or juvenile
court clerk.
(5) "Department" m e a n s the Department of H u m a n
Services.
(6) "Domestic violence" means the same as that term is
defined in Section 77-36-1.
(7) "Ex parte protective order" means an order issued
without notice to the defendant in accordance with this
chapter.
(8) "Foreign protective order" means a protective order
issued by another state, territory, or possession of the
United States, tribal lands of the United States, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia
shall be given full faith and credit in Utah, if the protective order is similar to a protective order issued in
compliance with Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse
Act, or Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures
Act, and includes the following requirements:
(a) the requirements of due process were met by
the issuing court, including subject matter and personal jurisdiction;
(b) the respondent received reasonable notice; and
(c) the respondent had an opportunity for a hearing regarding the protective order.
(9) "Law enforcement unit" or "law enforcement
agency" means any public agency having general police
power and charged with making arrests in connection
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103-32
of which is a civil violation, as provided in Subsection
valid i:
30-6-4.2(5);
tribal 1
(hi) language in the criminal provision portion
stating violation of any criminal provision is a class A
misdemeanor, and language in the civil portion stat- 30-6-4.1.
ing violation of or failure to comply with a civil
(1) At ai
provision is subject to contempt proceedings;
(iv) a space for information the petitioner is able to protection,
provide to facilitate identification of the respondent, court of ea
30-6-2. A b u s e o r d a n g e r of a b u s e — P r o t e c t i v e orders.
such as social security number, driver license num- litigation, <
(1) Any cohabitant or a n y child residing with a cohabitant
ber, date of birth, address, telephone number, and case invoh
number, a:
who h a s been subjected to abuse or domestic violence, or to
physical description;
informatio
whom there is a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of
(v) a space for the petitioner to request a specific
(2) (a) i
abuse or domestic violence, may seek an ex parte protective
period of time for the civil provisions to be in effect,
chapta
order or a protective order in accordance with this chapter,
not to exceed 150 days, unless the petitioner provides
availa
whether or not that person h a s left the residence or t h e
in writing the reason for the requested extension of
(b)
premises in a n effort to avoid further abuse.
the length of time beyond 150 days;
order
(2) (a) A petition for a protective order may be filed under
(vi) a statement advising the petitioner that when
(c) .
this chapter regardless of whether a n action for divorce
a minor child is included in an ex parte protective
chapto
between t h e parties is pending.
order or a protective order, as part of either the
betwe
(b) If a complaint for divorce h a s already been filed in
criminal or the civil portion of the order, the peti(3) A p
district court, a petition under this chapter may be filed as
tioner may provide a copy ofthe order to the principal documents
part of the divorce proceedings.
of the school where the child attends; and
separately
(3) A cohabitant, t h e department, or any person or institu(vii) a statement advising the petitioner that if the
to be mad<
tion interested in a minor m a y seek a protective order on
respondent fails to return custody of a minor child to
to a peace
behalf of the minor under t h e circumstances described in
the petitioner as ordered in a protective order, the
Subsection (1), regardless of whether t h e minor could have
30-6-4.2.
petitioner may obtain from the court a writ of assis^
filed a petition on his own behalf. If a cohabitant intends to
tance.
seek a protective order on his own behalf and on behalf of a
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is
minor, a single petition m a y be filed.
(1) Ifit
(4) The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent not represented by an attorney, it is t h e responsibility of t h e
a petition
the minor if t h e court considers t h e appointment necessary for court clerk's office to provide:
violence o
(a) the forms adopted p u r s u a n t to Subsection (1);
the welfare of t h e minor.
protection
(b)
all
other
forms
required
to
petition
for
a
n
order
for
(5) The county attorney or district attorney, if appropriate,
(a)
protection including, b u t not limited to, forms for service;
shall represent t h e department where the department aptectio
(c)
clerical
assistance
in
filling
out
t
h
e
forms
and
filing
pears as a petitioner.
as it <
the petition, in accordance with Subsection (l)(a). A court
(6) A petition seeking a protective order may not be withparti<
clerk's office may designate a n y other entity, agency, or
drawn without approval ofthe court.
1996
.(b)
person to provide t h a t service, b u t t h e court clerk's office
an or
30-6-3. Venue o f a c t i o n .
is responsible to see t h a t t h e service is provided;
appej
(1) The district court h a s jurisdiction of any action brought
(d) information regarding t h e means available for t h e
(2) A a
under this chapter. The juvenile court h a s concurrent jurisservice of process;
an order
diction of an action brought under this chapter if a protective
(e) a list of legal service organizations t h a t m a y repre(a)
order is sought on behalf of a minor unless the petition is filed
sent the petitioner in a n action brought under this chapor cc
by a natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent of t h e
ter, together with t h e telephone numbers of those organipetiti
minor against a natural parent, adoptive parent, or stepzations; and
ber;
parent of the minor.
(f) written information regarding the procedure for
(b)
(2) An action brought pursuant to this chapter shall be filed
transporting a jailed or imprisoned respondent to t h e
ing,
in t h e county where either party resides or in which t h e action
protective order hearing, including an explanation of t h e
petit
complained of took place.
1995
use of transportation order forms when necessary.
(0
(3) No charges may be imposed by a court clerk, constable,
petit
30-6-4. F o r m s for p e t i t i o n s a n d protective o r d e r s —
or law enforcement agency for:
resp<
Assistance.
(a) filing a petition under this chapter;
place
(1) (a) The offices ofthe court clerk shall provide forms and
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order;
any
nonlegal assistance to persons seeking to proceed under
petit
(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified,
this chapter.
ber;
necessary for service or delivery to law enforcement
(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall de<d)
officials; or
velop and adopt uniform forms for petitions and orders for
of a
(d) fees for service of a petition, ex parte protective
protection in accordance with the provisions of this chappetit
order, or protective order.
ter on or before September 1, 1995. That office shall
ing,
(4) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing
provide the forms to the clerk of each court authorized to
the <
and verified.
issue protective orders. The forms shall include:
(e!
(5)
(a)
All
orders
for
protection
shall
be
issued
in
t
h
e
form
(i) a statement notifying the petitioner for an ex
esse
adopted by the Administrative Office ofthe Courts pursuparte protective order that knowing falsification of
enfo
any statement or information provided for the purant to Subsection (1).
resi(
pose of obtaining a protective order may subject the
(b) Each protective order issued, except orders issued
safe!
petitioner to felony prosecution;
ex parte, shall include t h e following language:
and
(ii) a separate portion of the form for those provi"Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity
petil
sions, the violation of which is a criminal offense, and
to be heard in the hearing t h a t gave rise to this order.
ings
a separate portion
forbythose
provisions,
the violation
Digitized
the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clarkto
Law
BYU.
Pursuant
theSchool,
Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, P.L.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with enforcement of the criminal statutes and ordinances
of this state or any political subdivision.
(10) "Peace officer" means those persons specified in
Title 53, Chapter 13, Peace Officer Classifications.
(11) "Protective order" means a restraining order issued pursuant to this chapter subsequent to a hearing on
the petition, of which t h e petitioner h a s given notice in
accordance with this chapter.
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(c) class A misdemeanor if the act involves the operation or other use of a motor vehicle;
(d) third degree felony if the act involves the use of a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(e) third degree felony if the hazing results in serious
bodily injury to a person; or
(f) second degree felony if hazing under Subsection
(3)(e) involves the use of a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601.
(4) A person who in good faith reports or participates in
reporting of an alleged hazing is not subject to any civil or
criminal liability regarding the reporting.
(5) (a) This section does not apply to military training or
other official military activities.
(b) Military conduct is governed by Title 39, Chapter 6,
Utah Code of Military Justice.
(6) (a) A prosecution under this section does not bar a
prosecution of the actor for:
(i) any other offense for which the actor may be
liable as a party for conduct committed by the person
hazed; or
(ii) any offense, caused in the course of the hazing,
that the actor commits against the person who is
hazed.
(b) Under Subsection (6)(a)(i) a person may be separately punished, both for the hazing offense and the
conduct committed by the person hazed.
(c) Under Subsection (6)(a)(ii) a person may not be
punished both for hazing and for the other offense, but
shall be punished for the offense carrying the greater
maximum penalty.
1997
76-5-108.

P r o t e c t i v e orders restraining abuse of another — Violation.
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject
to a protective order or ex parte protective order issued under
Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter
3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as
described in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly
violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be
provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a
domestic violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to
increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1.
1999

76-5-109. Child abuse.
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(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of
the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or
causing the child's head to impact with an object or
surface;
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot
water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon
the skin or body of the child;
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous
weapon as denned in Section 76-1-601;
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person, either at the same
time or on different occasions;
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body;
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in
severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay
or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's
ability to function;
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ;
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease
breathing, even if resuscitation is successful following the conduct; or
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or
failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the
child's life.
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child
is guilty of an offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
felony of the second degree;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third
degree; or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a
class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or,
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an
offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
class A misdemeanor;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a
class C misdemeanor.
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with
treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer, in lieu of
medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and practices of an established church or religious denomination of
which the parent or legal guardian is a member or adherent
shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have committed
an offense under this section.
1999

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child" means a h u m a n being who is 17 years of age
or less.
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Sub76-5-109.1. Commission of domestic violence in the
section (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1.
presence of a child.
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of
a child which impairs the physical condition of the child,
(1) As used in this section:
including:
(a) "Domestic violence" means the same as t h a t term is
defined in Section 77-36-1.
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin;
(b) "In the presence of a child" means:
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion;
(i) in the physical presence of a child; or
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or
(ii) having knowledge that a child is present and
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's
may see or hear an act of domestic violence.
health or welfare and which is not a serious physical
injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d).
(2) A person is guilty of child abuse if he:
(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide,
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury
as defined in Section 76-5-201, against a cohabitant in the
or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's
presence of a child; or
health, or which involves physical torture or causes serithe Howard
W. which
Hunter Law
Library,
Clark
Law School, causes
BYU. serious bodily injury to a cointentionally
ous emotional Digitized
harm tobythe
child, or
involves
a J. Reuben(b)
errors. or uses a dangerous weapon, as defined &
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SEVENTH
OSSTfliCT COURT
5 t

Grand County

BiEo
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By: Rosalie Reilly #6637
148 South Main Street #1
Post Office Box 404
Monticello, Utah 84535
Telephone & Fax: (435) 587-3266

SE? 0 2 1998
CLERK OF THE COURT
"Doputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 East Center Street, Moab

RACHEL TUCKER,
Petitioner,

*

PROTECTIVE ORDER

*

vs.

*
*

Case No. 9847-94
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

GREG TUCKER,
Respondent.

This matter came on for hearing on August 19, 1998 at the hour of 3:30 p.m. in the
Seventh District Court, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding. Petitioner was present and
represented by her attorney, Rosalie Reilly. The Respondent was present and represented by his
attorney, Bruce Oliver. At that time, Respondent moved to have the instant Petition dismissed
on the basis that another Protective Order was in effect (Case No. 9647-44). Petitioner moved to
amend, changing the Petition for Protective Order to a Petition for Modification. The Court
granted the motion to amend and ordered the cases consolidated as case number 9847-94. Since
that time, the Court has learned that the Protective Order in case 9647-44 was dismissed on the
5th day of August, 1998. The Court, therefore, vacates it's order and reinstates the Petition for
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protective Order under case number 9847-94.
Based on the testimony received, and having heard argument of the parties, the Court
orders as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
1. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit
domestic violence or abuse against Petitioner.
2. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit
domestic violence or abuse against the minor children, namely, Brittany Tucker, (date of birth:
1/6/92); Trevor Tucker, (date of birth: 8/18/93); Tyler Tucker, (date of birth: 8/18/93); and other
household members, Marcy Jarrett; Colt Jarrett and Theresa Adams.
The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing,

&

telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner.
4. The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the Petitioner's school, place of
employment, and other places frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and designated
family or household members. Specifically, the following addresses:
3641 Roberts Road, Moab, Utah.
425 South Main Street, Moab, Utah.
300 E. 200 South ft 1, Moab, Utah.
5. The Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm or other
weapon.
6. The Petitioner is granted permission to retrieve her essential belongings, as well as the
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children's essential belongings from the marital residence.
7. Petitioner is granted temporary custody of the parties' minor children, namely
Brittany, Trevor, and Tyler Tucker.
8. The Respondent is allowed supervised visitation of the parties' minor children
through the Department of Family Services.
9. The Respondent is restrained from using alcohol and drugs prior to and during the
supervised visitation with the parties' minor children.
10. The Respondent is ordered to pay child support in the amount of $300.00 per month
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
11. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor children's day care expenses
actually incurred by Petitioner.
RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS 1-8 OF THIS ORDER WILL
CONSTITUTE A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR. EITHER PARTY MAY BE HELD IN
CONTEMPT FOR IGNORING OR ALTERING HE TERMS OF THIS ORDER.

. day of ^ y / ^ / / ^\s*s
^

DATED this

, 1998,

B y T H E COURT:

\fa& R. ANDERSON "
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Serve Respondent at:
1171 Murphy Lane
Moab, Utah 84532
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D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah
FILED

JAN 2 2

1999

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo

STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff,
vs.
GREG TUCKER,

Case no. 9817-163
Defendant.

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Comes now the defendant, Greg Tucker, by and through counsel, D. Bruce
Oliver, and hereby moves this Honorable Court for a dismissal of this matter for the violation
of the Cohabitant Abuse Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 et seq. and Cohabitant Abuse
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-36-1 etseq. The Protective Order allegedly violated is
unenforceable by the State of Utah in a criminal proceeding.
This motion isfiledpursuant to the Declaration of Rights Clauses and Bill of
Rights expressed and implied under Article I, Sections 1, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 24, 25, 26, & 27
of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Said motion is further supported by the accompanying
memorandum of points and authorities which is incorporated herein and annexed hereto by this
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reference.
In this matter, the defendant is likely to prevail on the merits of this case and
said motion is in no way adverse to the public interest.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of
January, 1999.

^

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a telefacsimile to (435) 259-3926
and I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS, postage
prepaid, to: William L. Benge, Grand County Attorney, 125 East Center, Moab, Utah 84532.
Dated this 20th day of January, 1999.

/'
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W
^ ^>^<
7

v

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah
FILED

JAN 2 2

1999

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
GREG TUCKER,

Case no. 9817-163
Defendant.

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Comes now the defendant, Greg Tucker, by and through counsel, D. Bruce
Oliver, and hereby submits this memorandum of points and authorities.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are based on the statements made within the Information,
the police reports and supplemental reports prepared by the officers involved which have been
provided to the defendant, and any logical inferences drawn therefrom. These facts are
provided for the purpose of demonstrating a legal theory and Mr. Tucker does not concede to
these facts or this factual scenario nor does he admit any guilt expressed or implied.
1.

The defendant and the alleged victim, Rachel Tucker, are husband and wife

having been married for some time now.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2.

During the course of the marriage, the two have conceived and raised two

minor children, to wit: Brittney Tucker, a female, born January 6, 1992; Trevor Tucker, a
male, born August 18, 1993; and Tyler Tucker, a male, boy August 18, 1993.
3.

In addition, the defendant has two stepchildren born to the victim from prior to

their relationship, to wit: Marcy Jarrett, a female, born April 15, 1986; and Colt Jarrett, a
male, born May 21, 1987.
4.

For the most of this relationship, the parties have been without substantial

incident and a strong bond has been enjoyed by the parties and their children alike.
5.

At some point, the parties got into a fight and the defendant had been removed

from the marital residence by an Ex Parte Protective Order.
6.

Then on August 19, 1998 at the hour of 3:30 p.m. the Seventh District Court

conducted a Protective Order hearing wherein the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson granted a
Protective Order.
7.

Said Protective was prepared by the Utah Legal Services, Inc. which is

defective on it's face.
8.

The defendant has been subsequently charged with violating said Protective

Order
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PROTECTIVE ORDER IS UNENFORCEABLE FOR CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS AS IT IS VOID AND DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE.
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-6-4 outlines the form and content of a lawful

2
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Protective Order. This Section reads:
(1) (a) The offices of the court clerk shall provide forms and nonlegal assistance to
persons seeking to proceed under this chapter.
(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform forms
for petitions and orders for protection in accordance with the provisions of this chapter
on or before September 1, 1995. That office shall provide the forms to the clerk of
each court authorized to issue protective orders. The forms shall include:
(i) a statement notifying the petitioner for an ex parte protective order that
knowing falsification of any statement or information provided for the purpose of
obtaining a protective order may subject the petitioner to felony prosecution;
(ii) a separate portion of the form for those provisions, the violation of which is a
criminal offense, and a separate portion for those provisions, the violation of which is a
civil violation, as provided in Subsection 30-6-4.2(5);
(iii) language in the criminal provision portion stating violation of any criminal
provision is a class A misdemeanor, and language in the civil portion stating violation
of or failure to comply with a civil provision is subject to contempt proceedings;
(iv) a space for information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate
identification of the respondent, such as social security number, driver license number,
date of birth, address, telephone number, and physical description;
(v) a space for the petitioner to request a specific period of time for the civil
provisions to be in effect, not to exceed 150 days, unless the petitioner provides in
writing the reason for the requested extension of the length of time beyond 150 days;
(vi) a statement advising the petitioner that when a minor child is included in an
ex parte protective order or a protective order, as part of either the criminal or the civil
portion of the order, the petitioner may provide a copy of the order to the principal of
the school where the child attends; and
(vii) a statement advising the petitioner that if the respondent fails to return
custody of a minor child to the petitioner as ordered in a protective order, the petitioner
may obtain from the court a writ of assistance.
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is not represented by an
attorney, it is the responsibility of the court clerk's office to provide:
(a) the forms adopted pursuant to Subsection (1);
(b) all other forms required to petition for an order for protection including, but
not limited to, forms for service;
(c) clerical assistance infillingout the forms and filing the petition, in accordance
with Subsection (l)(a). A court clerk's office may designate any other entity, agency,
or person to provide that service, but the court clerk's office is responsible to see that
the service is provided;
(d) information regarding the means available for the service of process;
(e) a list of legal service organizations that may represent the petitioner in an action
brought under this chapter, together with the telephone numbers of those organizations;
and
(f) written information regarding the procedure for transporting a jailed or
3
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imprisoned respondent to the protective order hearing, including an explanation of the
use of transportation order forms when necessary.
(3) No charges may be imposed by a court clerk, constable, or law enforcement
agency for:
(a) filing a petition under this chapter;
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order;
(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified, necessary for service or
delivery to law enforcement officials; or
(d) fees for service of a petition, ex parte protective order, or protective order.
(4) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing and verified.
(5) (a) All orders for protection shall be issued in the form adopted by the
Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to Subsection (1).
(b) Each protective order issued, except orders issued ex parte, shall include the
following language:
"Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing
that gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States,
the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States territories."
Id. In this matter, the Protective Order that has been allegedly violated is unlawful as it does
not comport with Section 30-6-4 in many respects.
A.
The Protective Order is Not on the Form Uniformly Adopted by the
Administrative Office of the Courts.
Subsection (1) provides that the offices of the court clerk shall provide the
necessary forms and nonlegal assistance to persons seeking to proceed under this chapter.
These forms have been specifically developed and adopted by the Administrative Office of the
Courts and distributed throughout the State of Utah to be uniformly provides and used by
persons seeking Protective Orders while still providing Constitutional protection to the
respondents or defendants of said Protective Orders. In this matter, the Protective order
prepared by Utah Legal Services, Inc. violated Subsection (1) because it was not prepared in
the Administrative Office of the Courts' form.

4
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B.
The Protective Order Inappropriately Criminalizes Would Be Civil
Provisions of the Uniform Forms.
On the approved forms there are numbered paragraphs and alphabetical
paragraphs. The number paragraphs are provisions if violated warrant criminal offenses. The
alphabetical paragraphs are provisions if violated do not warrant criminal offenses. The
numbered paragraphs provide the following:
1.
The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or
threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner.
2.
The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or
threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor children
and members of Petitioner's family or household:

3.
The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting,
harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner.
4.
The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away,
from Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at:
and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or interfering with
the utility services to the residence.
5.
The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of
employment, and/or other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the
minor children and the designated household and family members. These places are
identified by the following addresses:
6.
The Court having found that Respondent's use or possession of a weapon
may pose a serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from
purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s):
7.
The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence,
automobile and/or other essential personal effects:
This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic
proceedings.
5
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An. officer from, the following law enforcement agency:
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner
safely regains possession of (he awarded nron^rtv
• ^"ice from the same law enlorcei.ne.nt agency shall facilitate
Respondent ^ removal of Respondent's essential personal belongings from, the parties'
residence. The law enforcement officer shall contact Petitioner to make these
arrangements. Respondent may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to
obtain any items,
_ _ 1.0.
rhe Respondent is placed under the supervision *>t me Department of
Corrections for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Withn; J 4 hours o r
execution of this Order. The Department of Corrections shall place an electr* me
inonitoring device on Respondent and shall install monitoring equipment on the
premises of Petitioner ami r the residence of Respondent. Respondent is ordered tu
pay the Department of Correction* the cos^ .»* me electronic monitoring required by
this Order. The Department of Corrections shall ha\* an ess io Petitioner^ residence
to install the appropriate monitoring eouinr
In this matter, the prepared Protectee <)nk WA^COU* uiu Suu_

-v •

I In* ii i If • • in Ins milk i ill so criminalizes civil provisions il-.n au designed io expire in 150
days. • *jf defendant cannot Ocuiid**{

-"

•:

-.*,: * ^

issi^e* • • -nuna! offenses can , '. >e charged for intentionally cummiuiiig abuse u,
abuse are alleged to have b r e r " i-nuonally

violence. In this
committed.
I
iProtective

The Protective Order Does Not Provide Mandatory Language in the
Order.
The Protective Order is reqtitn d to im:luili' .toim vr i v IIII|POII<IIII ;mrl specific

olatements '"Hie order is required to include a statement advising the petitioner that when a
minor child is included H

,

ider or a protective order, as part of nitlu i

the criminal or the civil :-•' v : *: :ht- order, the petitioner may provide -> i «»p nil ihi> unit \ m
'I"1 p " » ' pill of 11 ii M iiool tvhere Ihe child altcnds The order is required to include a
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statement advising /;,-,; a v^u: 1 •* . ? iiw i M n r , , provision is in das 1 . A niisdemcMiioi, .in Il
language
subject!

; < a u i g \ lOjaiu-i: . * ** failure to comply with a civil provision is
n l m in limit1 .1 Maieineiit advising ihe

o - ^ .• . uoceedings. The order i

petitioner that: if the respondent foils to return custody of a minor child to the petitioner as
ordered ii :i a protects e • :::)i: dei , the petitionei maj obtain from the court a writ of assistance
The order is required to include the specific language:
Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that
gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L,
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the I Jnited States,
the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States territories.
jf

tjie

Q a s s ^ Misdemeanor provision, none of these provisions are included in

the oi der. And as for the Class A MisdemriMM'i \i\w\ sum

>, i nii'Ujnai I lit1 civil provision

and wrongfully criminalizes non-criminal behavior, Iliese failures and omissions cause the
II'imiifi'ii live Orrln m Iir• "'until us i is detective on il's face.
I».

The Protective Order Requires the Judge to Imimi Each Provision.
The lorm approved by the Administrative Office of Ihe Courts require the judge

to initial each and1 iTi'n iwm ism i I iiiifriitk'J in Lii'i \u d i e d against the respondent or
defendant

In this matter, the Protective Order judge has not initialed each of th* •
'Nip. iailuie and omission causes the Protective Order to h-* <uc as it

i* defective on it's face.
I
This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Proceed on the Criminal Offense in
Light of the Void and Defective Order.
The defniiiiiii II.II ml u o L n u l ' u u i u n A* > l*'S I hi* Section provides:
(1) Any person w h o is the respondent or" defendant subject to a protective order <
7
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parte protective order issuea undi r ' uL n\ \ 'napa- o, -^-habitant Abuse Act, or Title
78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Courts, Y \ v "* i hapter 36. Cohabitant Abuse Procedures
Act, or a foreign protective order as described ir S<. i r, ">0-612, who intentionally
violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be provided in,' ritle 77, Chaplin W
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act
i
30.

pendant has not violated a Protective Order as provided i inder Title
;

naptcr * o ;.ww / , , Chapter 36 in light

. on 30-6-4 as explained

hereinabove. As a result of said violation, this (*oun lack> ;r fiction to proceed a-:a-defendant. Che ilcliMuliiiil hir< Ml mttlafal n I Hie JU, i luipicr t\ lYotective Order.

CONCLUSION
* ••

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the defendant hereby respectfiill) reqi lests

this Honorable ( ' "

•

,, II I

« « ""

Mlhi

violated by the defendam ..s vi-.. .
RESP • «

• ""'i

i lit- i'loteetive Order alleged to have limi

defective on its face.

S UBMITTED this 20th day of

January, 1999.

/^<gv^<^>
lY BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MAILING
1 iicicby ccrtifv 'hai i cause;! (o In' Mansmitted a telefacsimile to (435) 259-39?6
and I mailed •;

• •.. ^OUL MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND

AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS pnsinj'L pivpaid ..
L. Iknge, Grand County Attorney, 125 East Center, Moab, Utah 84532.
Dated this 20th day ,u hiiii.uv \'">'>.

9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Wdliam

